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To eliminate the subsidy on the canal irrigation system, the Government of Pakistan 
has decided to reform the management, intending to make it more efficient, equitable, 
transparent, and able to take care of the sustainability of the world’s largest contiguous 
irrigation network. The water users are being entrusted with greater role in the 
management through the formation of Farmers’ Organisations (FOs) to operate and 
maintain secondary canals and pay for full cost of water delivery. Ultimate payer will be 
the farmer. The economic viability of the reforms, therefore, much depends on farmers’ 
ability and willingness to pay for the cost of irrigation water delivery, which is expected 
to rise. This paper estimates financial liabilities of the farmers in the post-reform 
scenario, and assesses their capacity and willingness to pay for liabilities in the provinces 
of Punjab and Sindh. One distributary in each of the two provinces is studied as the 
reference distributary, where FOs have already been formed. The cost of desired level of 
operation and maintenance levels are worked out using secondary data for 1997-98. With 
these costs, the water users in the Punjab and Sindh provinces need to pay Rs 333 and Rs 
373 per ha for their water service, respectively.  The estimated O&M costs form about 
5.4 and 3 percent of production costs and 3.8 and 3.5 percent of the net income in the 
Punjab and Sindh provinces respectively. The farmers’ net income from crop enterprise is 
higher than the cost of water. Thus, an average farmer has the potential to pay for water. 
Recent experience of Hakra 4-R Distributary FO suggests that the farmers are also 
willing to pay for water service, if they are organised properly.  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
At present, the revenue generated by the canal system is half the amount 
expended on operation and maintenance (O&M) for the province of Punjab, and the 
equation is even worse for the other three provinces of Pakistan. The O&M cost of 
the irrigation system is expected to rise further in future on account of the positive 
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relationship between the age and physical deterioration of the system. Persistently 
poor cost recovery situation  has helped the government to embark on introducing 
institutional reforms in irrigated agriculture to cope with the rising costs of operation 
and maintenance (O&M) and decreasing revenue from the irrigation systems. Under 
these reforms, the Provincial Irrigation Departments (PIDs) have been transformed 
into financially autonomous entities, as Provincial Irrigation and Drainage 
Authorities (PIDAs) for their respective provinces. The PIDAs will comprise a 
number of canal command level Area Water Boards (AWBs). Initially, the PIDAs 
are establishing pilot AWBs on one selected canal command in each of the four 
provinces. The pilot AWBs have initiated establishing Farmers’ Organisations (FOs) 
to take over the management responsibilities of the secondary system canals. The 
FOs will pay their respective O&M shares for the upstream irrigation system as well. 
The explicit objectives of the reforms are to manage the irrigation and drainage 
systems efficiently and improve the cost recovery [Punjab (1997); Sindh (1997)]. 
Though the PIDAs are yet struggling with legal, managerial, and financial 
frameworks, the reforms ultimately aim to establish a service-client relationship 
between PIDAs and AWBs, AWBs and FOs, and FOs and individual farmers. The 
service providers will provide water to the clients on bilaterally agreed terms and 
assess them for full payment of the costs of water delivery. The clients will be 
represented at the boards of the service providers. Therefore, the ultimate payer of the 
service would be the farmer. Paying full cost of water delivery would mean for the 
farmer much higher water charges than he is paying now [Small (1994)], even if he is 
not required to pay the capital costs of the system. Therefore, the success of these 
reforms will be highly dependent on the FOs’ ability to make themselves socially 
acceptable among the members of the farming community, and on being economically 
viable. Success in establishing FOs will indicate that the community is willing to 
accept these reforms. The evidence of farmer organisations at the distributary canal 
level in Pakistan to date suggests that if appropriate social organisational 
methodologies are followed, organising farmers is not only possible but that farmers 
also show eagerness to manage their systems [Bandaragoda, et al. (1997)]. Recent 
evidence from southern Punjab [Hamid and Hassan (2001)] conforms to the earlier 
findings, for example those of Meinzen-Dick, et al. (1995), which show that as a 
matter of fact the farmers manage their system much better than does the state. 
Since the farmers evaluate their system performance with regard to adequacy, 
reliability, and equity of the water service, the FOs can only be sustained by 
improving the system performance in terms of these indicators. As the total water 
diversions to canals are rather fixed, the adequacy of the water supply would be 
beyond an FO’s control. To improve equity and reliability of the irrigation water 
service, there is a need to improve the seriously deteriorated physical condition of 
the irrigation system, which has been caused by the persistent accumulation of 
deferred maintenance. For physical improvement, the FOs will need to undertake 
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optimal investments in O&M of their parts of the system. They also need to pay 
sufficient money to the AWBs for optimal O&M of the main system that transports 
water to the distributaries. The financial liabilities of the FOs are expected to be 
higher than the current water charges being paid by the farmers, considering the full 
funding of the recurrent O&M as the target to be achieved.  
The irrigation professionals in Pakistan usually question farmers’ capability to 
handle O&M of the secondary levels of the irrigation system as they consider that 
farmers lack the necessary knowledge. However, this question is not relevant, as the 
FOs can hire professionals from the market for O&M of the distributaries and pay 
them, if the FOs are able to generate money from irrigation revenue. The real 
question to be asked is whether these organisations are willing and able to mobilise 
the required financial resources to undertake the responsibilities for effective O&M 
of the distributary and minor canals and also meet their obligations to pay for the 
O&M of the upstream irrigation system. Their ability to mobilise necessary financial 
resources hinges upon individual farmer’s capacity and willingness to pay for 
irrigation water service. 
Since the productivity of irrigated agriculture as well as farmers’ returns from 
agriculture in Pakistan have declined for the past several years, one would wonder 
whether the farmers could afford to pay for the actual costs of a water service without 
an increase in their yields. The success of the current irrigation reforms largely depends 
on the capacity of the farmers to pay for water. Increasing water rates alone, without 
any consideration for their capacity to pay, would not yield any positive results. If the 
farmers have no capacity to pay, the FOs are likely to default, as many farmers will not 
be able to afford paying for water. The farmers’ capacity serves as an important social 
criterion in setting the level and structure of water charges [Chaudhry (1986)]. If there 
is no capacity to pay, the number of defaulters and the amount of defaulted recoveries 
will increase, implying that funding for O&M will not be available for future years. 
Thus, assessing farmers’ capacity to pay for water is crucial. 
The paper at hand, therefore, attempts to address two crucially important 
research questions in the context of reforms: What would be the financial liabilities 
of FOs for operating and maintaining the irrigation system? And will the individual 
farmers be able to pay for these obligations?  
This paper aims to address these two questions by estimating the financial 
liabilities of the farmers under the reform scenario, and by determining the farmers’ 
capacity to pay for these liabilities. Evidence from one of the pilot projects regarding 
farmers’ willingness to pay under the new set-up is also presented. The situation is 
analysed by looking into the current O&M spending, on the one hand, and by 
assessing the maintenance needed for the provincial canal irrigation systems and 
distributaries, on the other. The potential for financial viability of the farmers’ 
organisation is addressed with reference to farmers’ average capacity to pay for the 
target level O&M of the system. 
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Section 2 of the paper presents some salient features of the irrigation system. 
Section 3 illustrates research locale and methodology. Section 4 discusses the 
arrangements for O&M financing in the  pre-reform context, and Section 5 deals 
with the desired O&M requirements. Section 6 elaborates on farmers’ capacity and 
willingness to pay for water.  Section 7 concludes the discussion. 
 
2. IRRIGATION SYSTEM OF PAKISTAN 
Pakistan has an arid climate with very high temperatures in the central and 
southern parts of the country.  The weather plays an important role in determining 
agricultural productivity.  The average annual rainfall in the Indus plain and the 
Peshawar Valley is around 229 mm. Most rainfall is received during the monsoon 
season, from mid-June to mid-August. 
The major sources of irrigation water in the country are under public and 
private ownership. The private irrigation system constitutes 0.2 million tubewells 
located in the canal commands and dry land areas. Groundwater pumpage from these 
tubewells accounts for nearly 80 percent of the country’s total groundwater 
exploitation, about 20 percent of the total irrigation supply at the source, and 
approximately 30 percent of total irrigation supply at the root zone. The public 
irrigation system derives irrigation supplies from surface water and public tubewells.  
The Indus Basin Irrigation System commands 80 percent of the country’s irrigated 
area. 
The current Indus Basin Irrigation System (IBIS) comprises the river Indus 
and its two eastern and four western tributaries. This irrigation system is called the 
Indus Food Machine for its importance in Pakistan’s agriculture. The IBIS provides 
water for almost all the surface supplies. A small proportion of the surface supplies 
comes from the 30 small dams located in the hilly areas and the Pothohar Valley. 
The IBIS comprises of 3 major reservoirs, 19 barrages/headworks, 12 link canals, 
and 43 canal commands. The length of the link and main canals is around 845 and 
63,000 kilometres, respectively. The carrying capacity of the link and main canals is 
around 3.1 and 7.4 cubic kilometres of irrigation water per second, respectively. 
These canals provide water to the farmers’ fields through a network of 
approximately 89,000 tertiary channels, or watercourses. The total length of these 
watercourses is estimated to be over 1.6 million kilometres. The government 
operates and maintains the canal system; the farmers operate and maintain the 
watercourses. The culturable area benefiting from this system is estimated to be over 
14 million ha, which is irrigated by a network of a number of perennial and non-
perennial canals. Out of the total IBIS command area, 5.5 and 8.4 mha are located in 
the Sindh and Punjab provinces, respectively, where the major part of Pakistan’s 
irrigated agriculture takes place. Thus, intended reforms matter most to these two 
provinces. The study, therefore, focuses only on these two provinces. 
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3.  RESEARCH LOCALE AND METHODOLOGY 
For the analysis related to the FOs’ area of operation, one distributary in each 
of the two provinces was selected, where pilot projects for establishing FOs were in 
progress. The International Water Management Institute (IWMI), Pakistan, had 
selected these distributaries for its research on farmers’ participation in distributary 
management. The Hakra 4-R Distributary in the Eastern Sadiqia Canal Command, a 
medium-scale  distributary in the Punjab province, has a design discharge of 5.46 
cubic meters per second and a culturable command area of over 17500 ha. The 
distributary feeds 123 irrigation outlets through  its main channel and two minors.1  
There are 5 drop structures across the length of the main distributary, which is 
around 36 kilometres long and serves around 4700 farms. The farmers of the 
distributary are a mix of local people, recent settlers, and migrants by origin. The 
banks of the distributary were rapidly deteriorating due to animal and vehicular 
traffic. The freeboard has almost disappeared. The major maintenance problems of 
the distributary included berm-cutting, widened cross-sections, scouring in the head 
reach and silt deposition in the tail reach, and weak banks. The command area was 
gradually being converted to waterlogged and saline lands due to unreliable supplies. 
The farmers tended to grow rice for treating waterlogging and salinity, but usually 
over-irrigated due to unreliable supplies. The farmers complained about the inequity 
in the water distribut 
ion and wanted to improve the water supply especially with regard to equity 
and reliability. 
The Dhoro Naro Minor in the Rohri Canal Command was chosen as the 
reference channel in the Sindh province. This minor serves a command area of about 
5350 ha with a design discharge of around 1.46 cubic meters per second and 
irrigating the lands through its 25 outlets. The minor serves about 421 farms of 
varying sizes.  One of the major characteristics of the command area was a highly 
skewed distribution of land. The command area of the channel has been provided 
with a vertical drainage system, with 9 tubewells and a discharge in the range of 0.4 
to 0.6 cubic meters per second each and serving blocks of command area of  around 
130 ha. Along both of these distributaries, farmers have been organised into FOs. 
The basic purpose of these FOs is to undertake the O&M responsibilities for their 
respective distributaries.  
 
Methodology 
The maintenance costs for the provincial-level systems have been obtained 
from the maintenance yardsticks of the respective provinces and inflated to the 1997-
98 level using the inflation rates. The establishment (or operational) costs have been 
directly taken from the actual budgets of the PIDs. 
 
1The term “minor” is often used in the Sindh province to mean a small distributary. 
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The projects carried out detailed maintenance assessment surveys to assess the 
required O&M costs. Socio-economic surveys entailed farmers income from crop 
production. The project staff prepared draft business plans after wide consultation 
with the FOs [Pirzada, et al. (1998); Hassan and Khatri (1998)]. These data have 
been used to estimate the O&M costs for the distributary level, as well as the 
incomes of farmers. The difference in the provincial-level O&M costs and the FO-
level costs is treated as O&M costs of the primary irrigation system (barrages, main 
and branch canals) upstream of the distributaries.  
 
4.  PRE-REFORM O&M FINANCING 
O&M Costs Defined 
The PIDs generally refer to maintenance costs as maintenance and repair 
(M&R) costs. These include all construction, repair, silt removal, etc., that are not 
performed by the department’s own employees, but are completed by registered 
(qualified) contractors instead. Maintenance and repair costs can be defined as the 
direct costs expended on the physical upkeep of the irrigation system. Another 
category of maintenance costs is referred to as “rehabilitation and improvement” 
costs. These costs do not form part of the regular maintenance cost allocations but 
are prepared as development projects and are generally aimed at lining and re-
modelling canal systems, as well as extending the existing canal system. 
Operational costs include staff salaries, allowances, and other benefits, usually 
referred to as “establishment charges” by the Irrigation Department. Fuel and 
lubrication for official vehicles and other office utilities form part of establishment 
expenditures as well.  
 
O&M Budgeting and Allocation Procedures 
The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) operates and 
maintains the reservoirs. The respective PIDs are responsible for the O&M of the 
irrigation and drainage infrastructure within respective provinces, as irrigation is a 
provincial affair. The PIDs estimate annual O&M requirements, prepare budgetary 
proposals, and forward these to the Finance Department. A “yardstick”2 serves as the 
basis to prepare budgetary demands for maintenance and repairs of the irrigation 
system. The latest yardstick for the Sindh Province was approved in 1986, and 
similarly, for the Punjab, by the Punjab Finance Department in 1992. Budgets 
demanded are not always approved [World Bank (1996)] and budgetary allocations 
 
2The provincial governments have worked out standard costs of constructing and maintaining 
civil works in terms of amount of work and the cost of material, labour, etc. This is generally referred to as 
a “yardstick”. PIDs in the Punjab and Sindh revise their yardsticks from time to time, but rather 
infrequently. 
Farmers’ Financial Capacity and Willingness to Pay for Irrigation 55
against these demands are usually lower due to cuts on the so-called “non-
development” budget.3 Besides, the yardstick is not adjusted in view of inflation 
levels. Thus, budget estimates ignore cost escalation after the year the yardstick has 
been approved. Another limitation in the yardstick approach is that there is no 
provision for purchase and maintenance of durable goods such as vehicles, 
equipment, etc., which may necessarily be required for optimal O&M of the system. 
Consequently, the rigidities in the yardstick approach do not allow capturing the 
effects of long-run economic and technological changes. Financial allocations based 
on the yardstick approach do not consider ever-increasing prices for labour and 
materials, and have considerably limited the quality of maintenance work. 
 
Revenue Assessment and Collection Procedures 
At present, the PIDs impose water charges on a per area basis, and these vary 
with the crops grown in each season. One obvious reason for levying crop-based 
water charges is that the farmers comprehend this structure easily. Water charges are 
set ad hoc, and there appears to be no systematic procedure for increases. Increases 
are not linked to inflation but rather to donor pressure. In both absolute and real 
terms, the result has been a decline in revenue. The variation in water charges among 
various crops is based on water requirements for those crops. However, the 
relationship is neither systematic nor directly proportional to the consumptive use of 
water by various crops [Chaudhry, et al. (1993)]. For instance, the water rates for 
rice and sugarcane should be much higher than those for cotton. In the Eastern 
Sadiqia Canal Command, the rates for rice are 5 percent lower than those for cotton, 
and 90 percent higher for sugarcane [Iqbal (1996); Mahmood (1996)]. Neither do 
water charges have anything to do with income generated by these crops [Chaudhry 
(1986)]. In current water pricing, the rational agricultural producers tend to maximise 
water use although it may be highly scarce. 
The assessment system consists of detailed written records, whereby every 
action is double-checked at one stage or another. The underlying assumption, at the 
time of design, for such a complex water charges system was to eliminate, or lessen, 
corruption opportunities for the lower cadres of the Revenue and Irrigation 
Department staff.  These complications, nonetheless, have opened ways of 
corruption [Chaudhry (1986)].  In the current system of water charges assessment, an 
irrigation assessor, or patwari, assesses the water rate based on the condition of the 
crop. This enables farmers to negotiate an arrangement to under-report the cropped 
area, or to declare a poorly harvested crop. The irrigation assessor, being a poorly 
paid official enjoying high social power within his area of jurisdiction of four to five 
villages, finds it difficult to avoid making money from such arrangements. The result 
of this assessment procedure is that much of the cropped area is reported fallow. 
 
3The budgetary allocations for PID, Punjab, during 1993-94, for instance, were almost 30 percent 
less than the demand. 
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O&M Spending and Cost Recovery  
O&M Costs: In general, the major part of O&M costs comprises operational 
costs; more specifically, establishment expenditures incurred for staff salaries and 
benefits, supplies and services, communication, and utilities. This recurrent expense 
does not fluctuate very much from one year to the next, unless the government 
undertakes a major revision of benefits for civil servants. Maintenance costs, except 
for emergencies like breaches, cuts, flood control, etc., are largely well-known in 
advance.  
Financial constraints, to some extent, inhibit the PID’s ability to carry out the 
required maintenance adequately. For instance, allocations during 1995-96 were 15 
percent short of the budget demanded. A brief overview of the operation and 
maintenance costs incurred on the irrigation infrastructure, in both provinces, is 
presented in Table 1. The O&M expenditures presented here exclude costs related to 
public tubewells, assuming that the users bear the O&M costs themselves. The 
government has already started programmes to turn tubewells over to the users. 
Operational expenses are around 70 percent of the total costs, while the 
remaining 30 percent are expended on maintenance.4 Average establishment 
expenditure per hectare of command area is around Rs 1595 and Rs 203 in the Punjab 
and Sindh provinces, respectively. Maintenance expenditures were about Rs 68 and 
Rs 85, respectively, for the Punjab and Sindh provinces. Average total O&M 
expenses for canal irrigation systems in the Punjab and Sindh provinces, 
respectively, are around Rs 227 and Rs 288 per ha. 
 
Table 1 
Operation and Maintenance Costs of Canal Irrigation Infrastructure  
in Punjab and Sindh Provinces 
(Rs in Millions) 
Serial No. Particulars Punjab (1995-96) Sindh (1997-98) 
1 Total Establishment Costs 1339.23 (159.43) 873.08 (203.04) 
2 Total Maintenance Costs 570.73 (67.94) 363.61(84.56) 
3 Total O&M Costs 1909.96 (227.38) 1236.69(287.60) 
4 Establishment Costs as Percent of O&M 70 71 
5 Maintenance Costs as Percent of O&M 30 29 
Source: Irrigation and Power Department, Punjab, and  Pirzada, et al. (1998). 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are average expenditures per hectare of CCA. 
 
4This amount, nevertheless, is not necessarily actually spent on maintenance. The findings of 
Mudasser (1997) showed that irrigation contractors were of the opinion that they had to pay 15–20 percent of 
the contracted tender value as a commission to gain approval for the tender. Only a few contractors were 
interviewed, however. 
51 US$ = Pak Rs 46.50. 
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Revenue Collection: The average revenue generated by the collection of 
water charges during 1995-96 was around Rs 164 and Rs 137 per ha for the Hakra 4-
R Distributary in the Punjab and the Bareji Distributary in Sindh, respectively. These 
revenue figures were obtained by consolidating the PID records for the respective 
distributaries. According to the results of another sample survey of 117 farmers 
selected at random from along the Hakra 4-R Distributary [Hassan and Khatri 
(1998)], all reported that they had paid abiana (water charges). Only 1 percent of the 
sampled farmers had reported crop failure (kharaba) to qualify for a concession of 
the abiana. The general belief is that the secondary-level irrigation systems generate 
revenues that usually exceed the costs incurred on these systems. This view is rather 
simplistic, as the cost of water delivery from the source is not considered.  
At current collection rates, the canal system’s revenue falls short of the 
desired level of collection. Farmers are paying less than the target level. This subsidy 
can be met by controlling under-assessment and leakage. The present system of 
revenue assessment and collection provides many opportunities for farmers to 
influence the irrigation assessor to reduce water charges.  Claiming (falsely) 
hailstorm damage, or floods and earthquakes, identifying cropped land as fallow or 
healthy crops as struck by disease, and declaring that seeds completely or partially 
failed to germinate, is easily possible.6 Outlet enlargement is another means of 
misappropriating canal water.  
If the target of zero subsidy is to be achieved, users need to pay higher than 
current water charges, even at the present level of O&M spending, which might be 
much below the optimal maintenance requirements of the system. Therefore, there is 
a need to establish the desired O&M financing level, with the farmers’ liabilities 
based on these calculations. 
 
5.  DESIRED O&M FINANCING 
 
Maintenance Cost for the Provincial Irrigation Systems 
The PIDs use their respective yardsticks to estimate maintenance expenditures 
for one year. Despite the limitations, the yardstick can be used to estimate desired 
maintenance expenditures, if the estimates incorporate inflationary adjustments. The 
yardstick for the Sindh province, on a unit area basis, calculated maintenance 
expenditures to the tune of Rs 62 per ha for 1986-87 [Sindh (1987)]. The budgetary 
demands prepared by the PID in the Punjab for the year 1992-93, when the yardstick 
was revised [Punjab (1992)], are used to calculate the per unit cost of maintenance 
for the irrigation system. The total PID budgetary demands for the irrigation system, 
excluding tubewells, were around Rs 101 per ha. These estimates depict the required 
 
6For example, the underestimation resulted in an annual financial misappropriation of about Rs 60 
million in the Punjab province alone, according to Chaudhry (1986). 
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maintenance needs for the respective years. After inflationary adjustments, the 
maintenance cost for 1997 comes to Rs 174 for the Punjab and Rs 170 for the Sindh 
province. 
 
Average Establishment (Operational) Costs for 
  the Provincial Irrigation Systems 
Staffing policies announced by the provincial governments through the PIDA 
Acts clearly indicate that establishment costs will be reduced over time by the 
adoption of various measures, but no drastic change is expected initially. Therefore, 
it is assumed here that the average establishment costs for the irrigation system will 
not decline immediately, but will remain constant at current levels. Using budgetary 
allocations for 1997-98, average establishment costs for the provincial irrigation 
systems are estimated at around Rs 159 and Rs 203 in the Punjab and Sindh 
provinces, respectively. 
Average O&M expenses to meet the desired standards are estimated around 
Rs 333 and Rs 373 per ha for the Punjab and Sindh provinces, respectively. Out of 
these estimates, establishment costs are 52 and 45 percent, respectively, for the 
Punjab and Sindh provinces. 
 
Desired O&M Financing at the Distributary Canal Level 
For the two selected distributaries, a series of engineering and walk-through 
surveys were undertaken to estimate the extent of necessary maintenance. Based on 
the results of these surveys, cost estimates were prepared and have been reported 
separately [Water Users Federation (1997); Pirzada, et al. (1998)]. The FOs have 
also devised their staffing plans. Based on the findings of these studies, the following 
O&M expenditures have been calculated for the distributary-level O&M. 
Table 2 shows that the major maintenance areas that need immediate attention 
are repairs of banks, berms, and the service roads, etc.; tightening of cross-sections; 
and filling of scoured bed. Since the costs involved were quite high for the Hakra    
4-R Distributary, and as investments for some items generally have a longer life, 
costs such as repair of cross-sections and strengthening of banks were regarded as 
capital costs. The FO was unable to undertake these capital investments within a 
year. These repairs have been phased into a medium-term plan spread over a period 
of five years. The annual costs of maintenance are thus estimated at around Rs 1 
million. 
In the case of the Dhoro Naro Minor, major cost items are essential structures 
maintenance, and repair of the inspection path. However, the expenditures involved 
are not as high, compared to those of the Hakra 4-R Distributary. Therefore, the FO 
decided to undertake these activities within the first year. 
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Table 2 
Costs for Optimal O&M at the Distributary Level in the Indus Basin 
      Cost Item 
Hakra 4-R Distributary 
(Rs/annum) 
Dhoro Naro Minor 
(Rs/annum) 
(a) Maintenance 
     Essential Structures Maintenance 
     Silt and Vegetation Removal 
     Repair of  Cross-sections 
     Bank Strengthening 
     Repair of Inspection Path 
1,063,400 
– 
103,400 
580,000 
380,000 
– 
262,362 
62,692 
41,317 
36,000 
44,866 
77,487 
(b) Establishment Costs 
      Salaries 
      Supplies and Services 
      Travel (O&M of Transport) 
810,000 
660,000 
100,000 
50,000 
428,400 
360,000 
51,600 
16,800 
(c) Contingencies 20,000 10,000 
(d) Capital Costs (Equipment, 
Transport and Furniture), for the 
First Year only 267,000 93,600 
Average Cost (CCA ha) 124 149 
Average Cost without Capital Costs 
(Rs/ha) 109 131 
 
Apportionment for the Upstream and Distributary Level Costs 
Since FOs will manage the distributary level and pay for the upstream cost of 
water delivery, one major question is the cost allocation for the maintenance for 
these tasks. Assuming that the average maintenance expenditure at the provincial 
level will be incurred in view of the desired maintenance standards as prescribed by 
the respective yardsticks, and that inflation will be taken care of by escalating the 
costs, necessary expenses for maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure can be 
calculated. Another assumption pertains to the establishment. We can assume, as 
provided in the PIDA Acts, that there will be no initial change in the staffing of the 
PIDs and that the establishment expenditure will remain at the current level. Once 
we ascertain the O&M expenses at the provincial level, expenditure for the upstream 
system can be calculated as the difference between the overall average and 
expenditure on the distributary. The desired O&M spending, per hectare, on the 
distributary canal and for the canal system of the entire province is presented in 
Table 3 below. 
The estimated annual contribution by farmers along these two distributaries to 
the upstream maintenance is around Rs 113 and Rs 121 per ha for the Punjab and 
Sindh provinces, respectively. Likewise, the contribution for the upstream 
establishment is  estimated  at around Rs 111 and Rs 121 per ha, respectively, for the 
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Table 3 
Desired O&M Spending on the Canal System by the Management 
Mode in Pakistan 
(Rs/ha) 
Provincial 
Average for 
Canal System 
Distributary and 
Below 
Above 
Distributary 
Cost Category Punjab Sindh Punjab Sindh Punjab Sindh 
Establishment 159 203 48 82 111 121 
Maintenance and Repairs 174 170 61 49 113 121 
Total 333 373 109 131 224 242 
 
two provinces.  Thus, farmers in the Sindh province will need to pay a total amount 
of Rs 373 for water services per hectare per annum.  Of this amount, the FO will 
retain Rs 109, and Rs 242 will be paid to the AWB for upstream maintenance. 
Similarly, the water users in the Punjab province need to pay Rs 333 per ha for water 
services. The FO will spend Rs 109 per ha on distributary maintenance, and pay the 
AWB Rs 224 per ha for upstream maintenance.  
 
6.  FARMERS’ CAPACITY AND WILLINGNESS TO  
PAY FOR DESIRED O&M 
The capacity to pay for water depends directly on farmers’ incomes, 
especially from crop enterprises. According to the economic theory, a farmer will be 
willing to apply water to the crops as long as it generates more income than its per 
unit cost. If the marginal income from a crop by application of an additional unit of 
irrigation water is less than the water charge for that crop, the farmer is not able to 
pay for water. The net income criterion generally serves as a good approximation of 
farmers’ ability to pay for water charges. Net farm income,7 as a measure to assess 
the average paying capacity of the water users from both reference channels, is 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Average Net Farm Income at Hakra 4-R Distributary  
A socio-economic survey, encompassing 367 randomly-selected farms along 
the Hakra 4-R Distributary, was carried out in 1995 to assess, inter alia, farmers’ 
productivity and income from crops. The results showed that the major crops 
included cotton, fodder, and sugarcane in the summer, and wheat and fodder in the 
winter. The cropping intensity of the sample was estimated to be around 140 
percent. 
 
7 The net farm income includes returns to family labour, land, and capital. 
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To estimate the gross value of the product, average yields for various crops 
were multiplied by the average farm-gate prices received by the respondents. Net 
farm income was calculated by subtracting the average gross production costs from 
the gross value of production for all the crops. Average net production value per 
hectare was estimated by multiplying average net production values of various crops 
with the proportion of area sown for that crop, then finding the sum of the product. 
The costs and returns for various crops sown by the farmers are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Net Farm Income Calculations for Hakra 4-R Distributary in 1997-98 
(for a Representative ha of Land) 
Crops 
Percent 
of Area 
Under 
Crop 
Yield 
(kg/ha) 
Price 
(Rs/kg) 
Gross 
Value  
of 
Product 
(Rs/ha) 
Gross 
Produc-
tion 
Cost 
(Rs/ ha) 
Average 
Abiana 
Paid 
(Rs/ ha) 
Net 
Value 
Product 
(Rs/ha) 
Weighted 
Net 
Value 
of 
Product 
(Rs/ha) 
   1 2 3 4 5 (3x4) 6 7 8 (5-6) 9 (8x2) 
Cotton 0.4700 688 20.04 13787 6405  7382 3469.0 
Rice 0.0400 2503 4.09 10237 4480  5757 230.3 
Sugarcane 0.0400 39937 0.39 15575 5991  9584 383.4 
Gur 0.0500 3148 4.96 15614 4344  11270 564.0 
Sorghum(a) 
 (Fodder) 0.0100   4442 1959  2483 24.8 
Kharif 
 Fodder(a)   0.1400   6663 1852  4811 673.6 
 Oilseeds(b) 0.0025 869 17.22 14964 896  14068 21.0 
Vegetables 0.0050   7317 4327  2990 14.9 
Total Kharif 0.7575   9674 3947 121.00  5381.0 
Wheat 0.5500 2125 3.84 8160 3602  4558 2506.9 
Rabi Fodder(a) 0.0700   12230 2523  9707 679.5 
Oilseed(b) 0.0200 599 13.44 8051 1202  6849 137.0 
Vegetables 0.0050   24483 4500  19983 99.9 
Total Rabi 0.6450   5627 2204 81.10  3423.3 
G. Total 1.4025     202.10  8804.3 
Source: Author’s calculations based on [Hassan and Khatri (1998)]. 
Notes: (a) The fodder is sold on the basis of the area and not the weight. Therefore, instead of yields and 
prices, average gross value of product is directly calculated. 
 (b) There are many oilseed crops. However, for the purposes of the current study, the prices and 
yields have been averaged together as these are assessed together for charging for water. 
Besides, the area under such crops is almost negligible.  
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Crop yields for major crops for 1995-96, for the Punjab province, are quite 
comparable to the data used in this study [Pakistan (1997)].  The cropping intensity 
for the entire province during 1995-96 (131 percent) was, however, slightly lower 
than that reported for the Hakra 4-R Distributary. Nevertheless, accounting for non-
irrigated areas, the difference in the cropping intensity does not affect the findings 
significantly. Therefore, the net farm income calculations can be assumed as 
applicable to all irrigated areas of the province. 
Calculations yielded that the average annual net value of the product is around 
Rs 8800 per hectare, of which about Rs 5400 and Rs 3400 were realised in the 
summer and winter crops, respectively. Average water charges paid by farmers were 
estimated at around Rs 121 and Rs 81 per hectare in the summer and winter, 
respectively. Thus, the total water charges paid were estimated to be to the tune of Rs 
202 per ha per annum. Water charges paid formed around 3 percent of the average 
production costs and around 2 percent of the net income per hectare. 
If farmers have to pay the full cost of O&M, they need to pay Rs 333 per hectare. 
The target level of water charges forms about 5.4 percent of production costs and 3.8 
percent of the net income. Given the scarcity and importance of irrigation water for crops, 
farmers have the capacity to pay for the proposed water charges. The proposed water 
rates will reduce their net income from the crop enterprise by less than 2 percent, even if 
the farm productivity does not much improve as a result of the provision of a more 
equitable and reliable water service. While there are no significant negative financial 
implications of the reforms for farmers, there is more likelihood of increased returns for 
farmers as a result of improvements in the efficiency of irrigation systems.  
 
Average Net Farm Income at the Dhoro Naro Minor 
A detailed crop survey was undertaken during 1997 in the Dhoro Naro Minor 
command area, primarily to verify the cropping intensity and crop production in 
preparation of the business plan for the FO. The findings are reported in Pirzada, et 
al. (1998). Besides the business plan, useful information on agricultural income from 
crops was also produced. The following information, pertaining to the calculation of 
the net income, is extracted from that document. (See Table 5.) 
The cropping intensity at the minor was around 114 percent, which is almost 
double the average cropping intensity reported for the Sindh province [Pakistan 
(1997)]. However, the cropping intensities at the Rohri Canal command area, which 
feeds this distributary, were recorded to be around 120 percent [World Bank (1997)]. 
Crop yields more or less compare to provincial averages. Almost half of the total 
cropped area in the minor is planted during each of the two cropping seasons.  The 
gross costs form almost half of the gross value product. Taxes form around 6.5 
percent of the total production costs, while water charges at present form less than 1 
percent of both the total cost of production and the net farm income. The calculated 
water rates for full O&M funding form around 3 percent of the total production 
costs, and 3.5 percent of the net farm income. 
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Table 5 
Net Farm Income at the Dhoro Naro Minor in the Sindh Province in 1997-98 
S. No.    Particulars (Unit) Quantity 
1 Cropping Intensity (Percent) 
   Kharif 
   Rabi 
113.67 
59.98 
53.69 
2 Gross Value of Product (Rs/ha) 21,996 
3 Gross Costs (Rs/ha) 10,696 
4 Total Taxes (Rs/ha) 
Water Rates 
751 
77 
5 Total Cost of Production (Rs/ha) 11,447 
6 Net Farm Income (Rs/ha) 10,549 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on Table 39 of Pirzada, et al. (1998). 
 
Farmers’ Willingness to Pay for Desired O&M 
To secure the adequacy and reliability of irrigation water, farmers make illegal 
payments to irrigation officials which are often the same size as that of the payment 
for water [Mudasser (1997)]. If services improve as a result of better AWB and FO 
management, farmers would be willing to pay higher charges because the farmers 
believe that the service they get is more valuable than the charges they pay for it. The 
purchase of groundwater by farmers at much higher rates in the absence, or during 
insufficient supply, of canal water indicates their willingness to pay for water.8  
Another reason for farmers’ being willing to pay would be that they know that 
if they do not pay, they will be worse off than if they do pay. In the present system of 
irrigation management, the farmers who do not pay do not suffer due to weak 
accountability mechanisms and enforcement of law. In that sense, an important 
aspect of these reforms is that the pressures to pay are brought to the local level. 
Under the FO rules in Sindh, for example, the FOs can refuse to supply water to 
those who do not pay for water. The Hakra 4-R FO has already imposed a 1 percent 
daily surcharge on late payments. 
Unfortunately, the PID in Sindh had not transferred the distributary to the FO 
of the Dhoro Naro Minor till the finalisation of this paper. But the Punjab PIDA has 
transferred the Hakra 4-R distributary during the year 2000. The FO of Hakra 4-R 
Distributary took over the management of the distributary system from May 2000. 
During the initial period, it was able to improve equity as compared to the time when 
 
8An interesting example of farmers’ willingness to pay for water comes from the yet under-
construction areas of the Chashma Right Bank Canal. The farmers are allowed to pump and transport 
water from the main canal in areas where the secondary canals have not been constructed yet. Some 
watercourses run 2 to 3 kilometres to farm locations, and farmers pay as much as 25 percent of their 
produce to the pump operators.  
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PID managed the distributary [Hassan, et al. (2000)]. For the first crop season of 
Kharif 2000, it was able to record a more than 10 percent increase in the area 
assessed, as well as an increase in abiana assessment. Likewise, the FO was able to 
collect 95 percent of the dues against abiana within one month of the issuance of the 
bills [Hamid and Hassan (2001)]. This experience demonstrates the willingness of 
the farmers to manage their irrigation system and to pay for water. However, it needs 
to be seen if all of the FOs, which are being organised following different social 
mobilisation methodologies, can achieve similar results.   
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis reveals that in order to meet the O&M requirements of the canal 
irrigation system, users in the Punjab and Sindh provinces need to pay, respectively, 
65 percent and 384 percent more than what they are paying at present as a water 
charge for each hectare of land. Since the desired O&M costs form only a very small 
proportion of the net income, and only a small decline is expected in the net income 
due to the proposed increase in water rates, the average water users of both the pilot 
distributaries have the capacity to fully fund the O&M costs. The farmers’ net 
income from crop enterprise (even though the productivity is substantially below the 
potential) is higher than the cost of water. Besides, there might be some real sources 
of cost reductions for some of the farmers who are currently forced to pay bribes. 
Thus, an average farmer has the potential to pay for water. The institutional reforms 
under way, therefore, can be regarded as financially viable. Since water charges form 
a small fraction of the production costs, increased water charges do not have the 
potential to induce efficient use of water or a change in the cropping patterns, as the 
level of water charges is too low to influence farmers’ decision to invest in water 
conservation technologies. Recent developments in the farmer-managed Hakra 4-R 
distributary with regard to assessment and collection of water charges indicate that 
the farmers are actually willing to pay for water, as they consider it to be a valuable 
service. The proposed reforms in the irrigation system, therefore, to be seem 
financially viable for the Punjab and Sindh provinces, the major targets and 
beneficiaries of the reforms.  
To deliver a reliable and efficient water service to FOs, the PIDAs also need 
to rehabilitate the upstream irrigation system in a phased programme, as is being 
planned by the two FOs for their respective distributaries. A gradual rehabilitation 
programme would be more prudent as it will not disrupt the water supplies to 
farmers. An unnatural expectation would be for farmers to pay higher water charges 
without a corresponding improvement in the water service. The success of the 
reforms, therefore, will also depend on the ability of the AWBs and the PIDAs to 
undertake efficient operation, maintenance, and management of the upstream 
irrigation system. 
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Once the irrigation systems are in the paper condition to deliver water more 
reliably and equitably—and the FOs and the AWBs are able to resolve deferred 
maintenance during initial years, the maintenance expenditures may decline on 
account of the absence of deferred maintenance. This implies that water charges may 
also decrease after a few years. However, the inflationary cost escalations will need 
to be tackled at all levels.  
Removing the subsidy altogether within the first year may have social 
implications for the FOs and the government. Therefore, a gradual approach towards 
eliminating the subsidy would be more useful. The PIDA Acts for both provinces 
have also envisaged a gradual reduction in the subsidy, and require the FOs to be 
self-sufficient and pay the full cost for canal irrigation water in seven years’ time. 
The AWBs have to be self-sufficient in ten years’ time. Following a gradual 
approach in increasing water charges—and gradual increases in productivity levels 
anticipated as an outcome of improved irrigation services, the adverse effects on 
farm income due to rises in water charges could be minimised further.  
The amount of subsidy will increase initially because the government will be 
required to increase its maintenance expenditures, on the higher levels of the 
irrigation system being managed by the AWBs or the PIDAs. This is necessary, as 
there will be no incentive for the FOs otherwise to take over a deteriorated system in 
need of rehabilitation, which they would have to pay for. 
Another issue that may affect these reforms is the current methods of water 
charge assessment. The current crop-based method of water charge assessment and 
collection is extremely complicated, and inappropriate for the newly-created FOs 
as it involves a high cost of assessment and collection. It does not correspond to 
the water allocation principles either, as water is allocated on a flat, area-based 
rate. Therefore, the water charges also need to be based on a flat rate regardless of 
the crop grown; those which are believed to be more suited for the farmer’s 
management of distributaries in Pakistan, as well as for the PIDAs [Prathapar, et 
al. (2001)]. Flat rate cost-sharing in the canal system can serve as a close proxy for 
the volumetric charging system, if water rights of the FOs and the AWBs are 
clearly defined and adhered to, using the principles of proportionality. However, 
the decision of “how to assess and collect water charges” should be left to the 
respective FOs. The primary principles followed by the PIDAs, the AWBs, and the 
FOs should be equity, transparency, and simplicity in procedures, for which the 
current FOs are struggling.  
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